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I INTRODUCTION 
In 1989, the Supreme Court of Canada in Lac Minerals Ltd v International Corona 
Resources Ltd ("International Corona") 1 handed down a decision on the ownership of the 
Page-Williams Mine which has been estimated to be worth between C$1.5bn and C$3.0bn. 
The case had occupied the trial Judge 2 for 5.5 months, the Ontario Court of Appeal 3 for 10 
days and the Supreme Court for two days. The judgments in the various courts run to some 
200 pages. 
Apart from deciding the ownership of the invaluable property, the case is also of great 
interest to the commercial community since it contains observations from high judicial places 
on two important yet controversial issues - the concept of fiduciary relationship and the 
remedy of constructive trust. 
Although the concept of fiduciary relationship has been in our books for a long time, 
there is little consensus as to its underlying principles. The difficulty is compounded by the 
misuse of the term "fiduciary" in two main contexts. The first is where this concept has been 
used in a purely instrumental manner. The second relates to the application of the fiduciary 
concept in situations that are truly inappropriate. 
The fiduciary term is used in an instrumental sense where a fiduciary relationship is 
seen as the gateway for an in rem remedy, such as equitable tracing and constructive trusts. 
Thus, when an in rem remedy is appropriate in a case, a judge may "find" a fiduciary 
relationship simply to justify the award of that remedy. 
The inappropriate use of the fiduciary term describes a situation where, instead of using 
some other more appropriate legal concepts which may be less developed or less sophisticated, 
the fiduciary concept is invoked so that justice and the intended result can be achieved. The 
finding of a fiduciary relationship brings with it a number of specific duties which are strict. 
The range of remedies available is also greater. 
It will be argued in this paper that while the Canadian Courts in International Corona, in 
line with some earlier cases, abandoned the instrumental use of the fiduciary concept, the trial 
1(1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14. 
225 DLR (4th) 504. 
344 DLR (4th) 592. 
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Court and the Court of Appeal had perpetuated the inappropriate use of the fiduciary concept. 
By a bare majority of three to two, the Supreme Court of Canada managed to prevent this 
inappropriate use of the fiduciary concept on the facts of International Corona. 
The last decade witnesses an unprecedented leap in the judicial appreciation and 
development of the fusion of Law and Equity. As a result of major cases and decisions on this 
point, we have come to a stage where the availability of a remedy is no longer impeded by the 
historic divide between Common law and Equity. Remedies are now neither hierarchical 
(depending on jurisdiction) nor dependent on special rights but are available in a wide range of 
situation. International Corona presents a further opportunity for the examination of this fusion 
and its practical significance. 
Traditionally, the remedy of constructive trust will only be awarded if there is a breach 
of a pre-existing property right or fiduciary relationship. In line with some earlier cases, this 
traditional approach was not followed in International Corona. Instead, inquiries were directed 
to the facts of that case to see whether the remedy of constructive trust was most appropriate. 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal in Elders Pastoral Ltd v Bank of New Zealand 3a had 
indicated that a fiduciary relationship need not be shown before a constructive trust could be 
imposed. 
It is a submission of this paper that the court should only use the fiduciary concept in 
situations that are truly trust-like, where one person undertakes to act in the interest and 
for the benefit of another person in the exercise of a particular power or discretion 
delegated by that person, or some other person. The fiduciary concept is a concept purporting 
to promote a particular kind of commercial morality, not all kinds of commercial morality.4 
It is also submitted in this paper that the dropping of the requirement of fiduciary 
relationship before an in rem remedy - constructive trust - can be granted is to be warmly 
welcomed. The mission of the courts, including the New Zealand Courts, is to come up with a 
principled approach to the remedy of constructive trust with some guidelines as to the 
circumstances in which the remedy will be awarded. 
3a[1989] 2 NZLR 180. 
4See Finn, "The Fiduciary Principle" in Youdan (ed) Equitv, Fiduciaries and Trusts (1989), 1 generally. 
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II FACTS AND ISSUES 
International Corona Resources Limited ("Corona") was a junior venture mining 
company conducting a drilling programme in its property near Hemlo, Ontario. It was fairly 
clear from its drilling results that an adjacent property to Corona's, the Williams property, was 
likely to be potentially gold bearing. Some, but not all, of the results were published in a local 
mining journal. After reading the results published, Lac Minerals Limited ("Lac") got in touch 
with Corona and visited Corona's property with a view to entering into some joint venture or 
partnership agreement with Corona. During the visit, Lac examined a variety of geological data 
and discussed the programme with Corona's geologists. The parties were seriously interested 
in negotiating some joint venture agreement. As a result, ·there were two other meetings, an 
exchange of letters, some telephone conversations and a further delivery of geological data by 
Corona to Lac. 
In the course of negotiations, it was found by the trial Judge that confidential and 
private information - that the Williams property was likely to be gold bearing and the basis for 
that belief - was disclosed by Corona to Lac. Notably, this was to attract Lac and to enable Lac 
to evaluate the possibility of a joint venture with Corona. It was further found that, during the 
discussions, nothing was said expressly about the confidentiality of this information. 
Nevertheless, the Judge held it to have been obvious to Lac that the information was 
confidential and that it was divulged only in the context of the discussion. 
Corona made clear to Lac that it was interested in the Williams property and that it had 
already instructed an agent to obtain that property. Although, Lac did not say that it was not 
going to purchase the property, it encouraged Corona to actively pursue it's claims. 
In due course, Corona's agent contacted Mrs Williams, the owner of the Williams 
property. Unknown to Corona, Lac also made offers to Mrs Williams. Eventually, Lac's 
offer, though less attractive than Corona's, was accepted by Mrs Williams. 
It was a significant finding that Corona would have acquired the Williams property but 
for Lac's action. It was also found to be important that Lac would not have acquired the 
Williams property but for the confidential information it received from Corona. 
Inevitably, the joint venture negotiations broke down. Lac, with knowledge of 
Corona's possible claim to the Williams' property, effected some improvements - a mine and a 
3 
mill - on the property. This was valued at $153,978,000 to Corona. Corona then brought an 
action seeking an order that Lac "deliver up" the Williams property to Corona. Shortly after 
that, Corona entered into an arrangement with Teck Corporation ("Teck") under which Teck 
obtained an interest in the Corona property together with an interest in the result of Corona's 
law suit against Lac.5 
The major issues raised in the various Courts are: 6 
(1) Did Lac misuse confidential information obtained by it from Corona and thereby 
deprive Corona of the Williams property? 
(2) Did a fiduciary duty exist between Corona and Lac, when negotiating towards a 
possible joint venture or partnership, which was breached by Lac's acquisition of the 
Williams property for itself? 
(3) What was the appropriate remedy if the answer to (1) or (2) was in the affirmative? 
(4) Given that Lac effected those improvements on the Williams property with knowledge 
of Corona's possible claim, was Lac nevertheless entitled to compensation on those 
improvements if the property were to be delivered to Corona? 
At the trial, Holland J found that Lac had committed a breach of confidence. His 
Honour also found that there was a fiduciary relationship between the parties, which Lac had 
also breached. His Honour declared that upon Corona's paying to Lac $153,978,000, Lac 
was to transfer the property to Corona. On appeal, this position was upheld by the Ontario 
Court of Appeal. 
On a further appeal, the Supreme Court unanimously held that there was a duty of 
confidence between Corona and Lac which was breached by Lac. However, the Court was 
divided on the second and third questions. Sopinka J, with Lamer and McIntyre JJ 
concurring, found that there was no fiduciary relationship between Lac and Corona. La Forest 
J and Wilson J, in separate judgments, held that there was a fiduciary duty which was breached 
by Lac. 
5For these findings of facts see above n 2, 511-538. 
61n the trial the action was also pleaded in contract, but since a contract could not be shown to exist it was 
subsequently withdrawn. 
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On the question of an appropriate remedy, La Forest J, with whom Lamer J concurred, 
and Wilson J held that constructive trust was an appropriate remedy. On paying the value of 
the improvements on the property, Corona was entitled to the property. Sopinka J, with 
McIntyre J concurring, disagreed. Their Honours held that the appropriate remedy was 
compensatory damages and ordered Lac to pay $350,000,000 to Corona. This was one half of 
the total value of the Williams property. In contrast, the Court of Appeal, approved by La 
Forest J, held that if compensatory damages was appropriate, the full amount of the value of 
the property would be awarded. 
These issues will be discussed in this paper in the order set out. As previously noted, 
emphasis will be given to the Supreme Court's rulings on the point of fiduciary duty and the 
remedy of constructive trust. Other issues will only be covered in brief. 
III CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 
General - Breach of Confidence 
It is a widely accepted view that an action for a breach of confidence has a multi-
jurisdictional basis in contract, equity and property. This composite jurisdictional basis has 
produced many lingering problems in the remedial area.7 However, the lower Courts and the 
majority in the Supreme Court of Canada held that a constructive trust was the appropriate 
remedy for a breach of confidence without touching upon the jurisdictional basis of this 
action. 8 On the other hand, Sopinka J (McIntyre J concurring) held that compensatory 
damages were the appropriate remedy after giving some regard to the jurisdictional basis of 
breach of confidence.9 
All Judges adopted the test enunciated in Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Limited 10 as 
being appropriate to find whether there has been a breach of confidence. It requires essentially 
three elements: 
7 Gurry Breach of Confidence (1984) 25. 
8Trus seems to be the first clear Commonwealth decision for the authority that constructive trust can be granted 
in a breach of confidence action. Previously, a breach of confidence was regarded as a personal obligation: see 
Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Phillip Morris Ltd (1984) 156 CLR 414. 
9 Above n 1, 75. 
10[1969) RPC 41 (Ch). 
s 
(1) The information must have the necessary quality of confidence; 
(2) That information must have been imparted in circumstances imparting an obligation of 
confidence ( or for a limited purpose); 11 
(3) There must be an unauthorised use of that information to the detriment of the party 
communicating it. 
The Court's Findin2 on Breach of Confidence 
All Judges in all three Courts were satisfied that these elements were met on the facts of 
International Corona. All Courts agreed that: 
(1) Corona had communicated information that was private and confidential which had not 
been published; 12 
(2) While there was no mention of confidence, there was a mutual understanding between 
the parties that information was communicated in the context of negotiations towards a 
potential joint venture. As such, the information was imparted to Lac under 
circumstances giving rise to an obligation of confidence; and 
(3) Lac, without being authorised by Corona, made use of that information to obtain the 
Williams property. The information produced by Corona was the springboard that led 
to the acquisition of the Williams property .13 
Limited Purpose 
Although all Judges agreed to the test and its application to the facts of International 
Corona, La Forest J and Sopinka J differed in the nature and scope of the breach of confidence 
11see Gurry Breach of Confidence (1984) at 113: "The test ... for establishing the assistance of an obligation 
of confidence is predicated on the basis of a disclosure of confidential information for a limited purpose - an 
obligation will exist whenever confidential information is imparted by a confider to a confidant for a limited 
purpose." 
12The distinction between "public" and "private" information - where arguably both are used by a recipient may 
be extremely problematical. The recipient must then segregate the two. Although free to use the former, the 
recipient must take no advantage of the latter. There is a problem with the remedies for breach of confidence in 
such cases as the defendant may be liable only for such profits attributable to his wrongful use of the plaintiffs 
property. As such, apportionments of profit may be necessary: see Siddell v Vickers (1982) 9 RPC 152. 
13 Above n 1, 20. 
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on the facts. There was some suggestion that Lac was "only restricted from using the 
information imparted by Corona to acquire the Williams property for itself," and that "had Lac 
acquired the property on behalf of both Corona and Lac, there would have been no breach of 
confidence." 14 Notably, Sopinka J would not have held there to be a breach if Lac acquired 
the property for Corona and itself. 15 La Forest J remarked that this was erroneous since the 
evidence showed that both Lac and Corona contemplated Corona's acquisition of the Williams 
property. 16 
This difference in opinion arose out of the application of the second element of the test 
of breach of confidence to the facts of International Corona. The essential question was: what 
was the limited purpose for which the confidential information was disclosed? Was it 
disclosed so that it could be used to purchase the property for the joint benefit of both parties or 
was it disclosed so that Lac could assess in its own interest for itself the desirability of the joint 
venture? If it was disclosed for the use of the joint benefit of both parties, then Sopinka J's 
approach was right. The purchase of the property for the joint benefit of Lac and Corona 
would not be a breach but an implementation of the arrangement. Conversely, if it was to be 
used for the limited purposes of assessing the possibility of the joint venture by Lac's in its 
own interest, La Forest J's finding is correct. Lac could only use the information for assessing 
the desirability of a joint venture, and not to use that information to purchase the property. 
It is submitted that the latter is the correct view. It was obvious that Corona disclosed 
the information so that Lac could realistically assess the possibility of a joint venture with 
Corona. Lac could only derive a benefit from that information if the joint venture eventuated. 
If the joint venture fell through, it would appear to be the intention of the parties that Lac was 
not to use that information. 
Detriment 
Another interesting point is the formulation of the test in Coco v A.N. Clark 
(Engineers) Ltd which requires that the unauthorised use of the confidential information be to 
the detriment of the confider. This requirement was missing in the formulation of the test by 
La Forest J. 17 Indeed, La Forest J at some point remarked that the information need not be 
l4 Above n 1, 22. Dennis R Klick "The Rise of the "Remedial" Fiduciary Relationship: Comment on 
International Corona Resources Limited v Lac Mineral s Limited" (1988) 33 McGill L J 600. 
l5 Above n 1, 74. 
16Above n 1, 22. 
17 Cf A-G v Guardian Newspaper (No:2) [1988] 3 WLR 776, 795-796, 806. 
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used to the detriment of Corona. 18 However at other places, His Honour seemed to suggest 
that the unauthorised use must be to the detriment of the confider. 19 
It has been argued by Klinck that this requirement is unnecessary.20 He suggests that 
there are circumstances in which this requirement might cause problems, for example, if the 
acquisition of the Williams property was ultra vires Corona.21 It is arguable whether in this 
situation Corona should receive the property at all. Why should Corona be better off had there 
been a breach of Lac's duty? Corona would not otherwise be able to receive the property.22 
Klinck adds that insistence on the requirement of detriment would result in a situation 
where a breach of confidence action might fail but an action for a breach of fiduciary duty 
might succeed.23 One does wonder why it is so undesirable that an action in breach of 
confidence fails but a breach of fiduciary relationship succeeds. 
Besides, Klinck notes that another factor militating against the requirement of detriment 
is the availability of accounting for profits as a remedy for breach of confidence. However, it 
could be argued that the requirement of detriment goes to the elements establishing a breach of 
duty of confidence, whereas the accounts of profit relates to the remedy available . It is not 
entirely at odds to require detriment to be shown for establishing a breach, and in the award of 
remedy, accounts of profit be made available. 
Klinck further suggests that the inquiry is not into the pla.intiff s loss but into the 
defendant's gain.24 This suggestion will collide head-on with Sopinka J's observation that "in 
a breach of confidence case, the focus is on the loss to plaintiff". 25 In future cases, an 
adequate consideration by the courts on this requirement of detriment is clearly desirable. 
18Above n 1, 22. 
19Above n 1, 36. 
20 Above n 14, 608. 
21 Above n 14, 608. 
22CfKeech v Sandford (1726) Sol Cas T King 61. 
23 Above n 14, 608. 
24 Above n 14, 609. 
25 Above n 1, 76. 
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IV FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS 
The Fiduciary Concept 
The fiduciary concept is said to be "equity's blunt tool," 26 a concept 
frequently invoked but uncertain in its precise boundary. It appears that the court has no 
difficulty in enforcing fiduciary obligations in specific circumstances but at a more fundamental 
level, the court is unable to define the precise principle on which that obligation is based. 27 
Thus, we have assertions like "the real question is not who is a fiduciary but what is a 
fiduciary" 28 and "we are not sure what we are looking for, but we will know when we have 
found it"29 and that "the fiduciary relationship is a concept in search of a principle."30 
Attempts have been made to locate the underlying themes - a fiduciary principle -
for this concept. The conclusions are far from unanimous. Various doubts are expressed thus: 
"the principle governing fiduciary obligation may indeed be undefinable," 31 "whether there can 
be any universal, all purpose definition of the fiduciary relationship" 32 and that "the mystique 
of fiduciary law is beginning to melt."33 
To this end, some questioned the need for such a search arguing that it might be 
desirable to have a residual equitable category for enforcing commercial morality based on 
courts intuition on what is just and proper. 34 On the other hand, there are others who felt it 
desirable to pin down the theoretical basis for this concept. Meanwhile, the language of trust, 
confidence, 35 influence, abuse of power, reliance, inequality, loyalty, vulnerability, 
26Above n 1, 60. 
27 Above n 1, 26. Hospital Products Limited v US Surgical Corp (1984) 55 ALR 417, 432 per Gibbs CJ. 
28Gautreau, "Demystifying the Fiduciary Mystique" (1989) 68 Can B Rev 1, 2. 
29 Above n 14, 624. 
30sir Anthony Mason, "Themes and Prospects" in Finn (ed) Essays in Equity (1984), 246. 
31 Above n 1, 26. 
32Above n 27, 432-3 per Gibbs CJ; 458-9 per Mason J; 488 per Dawson J. 
33 Above n 28, 1. 
34Tate v Williamson (1866) LR 2 Ch App 55 per Lord Chelmsford. 
35see Marr v Arabco Trading Limited (1987] 1 NZBLC 102,372 (Tomkins J); and Loughlin, "Comment on 
Recent Developments in the Law: Fiduciary Liability and Constructive Trust Marr v Arabco Traders Limited" 
(1989) Otago L Rev 179. Tomkins J held: 
[F]iduciary relationships are founded on the existence of mutual trust and confidence of each in 
the skill, knowledge and integrity of other .... 
9 
selflessness, fiduciary care and the like continues to be flung around in courts only to 
oveiwhelm, not to illuminate. 
It is suggested that two uses of fiduciary concepts have resulted in this confusion. The 
first is where the use of this concept has been instrumental - invoked apparently only to permit 
a particular remedy to a situation where the remedy can only be granted if a fiduciary 
relationship exists. Thus, a thief was classified a fiduciary to his victim to enable equitable 
tracing;36 and payments into wrong hands was sufficient to find a fiduciary relationship to 
enable a constructive trust to be imposed. 37 
Secondly, the confusion arises out of the application of this concept in a context where 
more appropriate terms and concepts could have been used. This describes a situation where 
concepts of unconscionability, good faith or others should be invoked, but instead, the 
fiduciary concept is employed to find some special duty or consequence that is traditionally 
associated with fiduciary concepts. Otheiwise the special duty does not ensue or an action may 
not even succeed. It is the submission of this paper that the fiduciary concept was employed in 
precisely this inappropriate way by the lower Courts and the minority of the Supreme Court in 
International Corona. Instead, what should have been involved was the concept of good faith. 
The following discussion attempts to mark out this improper use of the fiduciary 
concept in order to come up with a practical working definition of fiduciary principle. 38 This 
paper does not attempt to define the relationship or the demarcation line showing the exact 
transition points between fiduciary relationships and non-fiduciary relationships. It is only a 
small step towards this task. It sets down an essential element of the fiduciary relationship 
which has been much watered down in recent case law. 
The Identification of Fiduciary Relationship 
The Fiduciary Principle 
It is a basic submission of this paper that a fiduciary relationship will arise when a 
person undertakes, expressly or impliedly, to act in the interest and for the benefit of another in 
36GoodBody v Bank of Montreal (1974) 47 DLR (3d) 335. 
37Sinclair v Brougham (1914] AC398, Chase-Manhattan NA v Israel British Bank (London) Ltd (1981] Ch 
105. 
38Finn has completed a significant piece of writing in that direction. Above n 4. 
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a particular matter understood by them. To that end the fiduciary has been entrusted with a 
special power or discretion to affect that other's interest. 
Finn has the following to say about fiduciary relationships: 
[T]he actual circumstances of a relationship are such that one party is entitled to expect 
that the other will act in his interest in and for the purposes of the relationship. 
Ascendancy, influence, vulnerability, trust, confidence or dependence doubtless will be 
of importance in making this out, but they will be important only to the extent that they 
evidence a relationship suggesting that entitlement...the role that the alleged fiduciary 
has ... must so implicate that party in the other's affairs or so aligning him with the 
protection or advancement of that other's interest that a foundation exists for the 
"fiduciary expectation. "39 
This is in line with the general test enunciated in the High Court of Australia in Hospital 
Products Limited v US Surgical Corp: 
The critical feature of these relationships is that the fiduciary undertakes or agrees to act 
for or on behalf of or in the interests of another in the exercise of a power or discretion 
which will affect the interests of that other person in a legal or practical sense. The 
relationship between the parties is therefore one which gives the fiduciary a special 
opportunity to exercise the power or discretion to the detriment of that other 
person .... 40 
The same point has been squarely made in Standard Investments Limited v Canadian 
Imperial Bank of Commerce: 
It is the undertaking to act for and on behalf of another which imports the fiduciary 
responsibility. The conflicts of duty and interest rule applies not simply because of the 
placing of trust and confidence but ... because of the undertaking of the fiduciary to act 
for or on behalf of his principal.41 
39 Above n 4, 46. 
40 Above n 27, 454. 
41 (1983) 5 DLR (4th) 452, 483. 
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Similar views have been expressed by many judges and prominent writers, such as, 
Scott,42 Weinrib,43 Shepherd,44 Frankel,45 Dickson C J,46 Gibbs C J,47 Somers J,48 to 
name a few.49 
The existence of a fiduciary relationship is therefore determined by two elements. The 
first is the representative element, which is the undertaking to act by the fiduciary in the 
interest and for the benefit of another. The second is the special power element which is a 
discretion delegated or entrusted to the fiduciary with the result that the beneficiary is in a 
peculiarly vulnerable position. Confidence, undue influence, duress, unequal bargaining 
power and so forth may be probative factors in establishing these two ingredients giving rise to 
a fiduciary relationship, and thus the ensuing fiduciary duties. 
Thus, the fiduciary principle is not about whether a person overstepped the bounds of 
acceptable commercial morality, such as a lack of good faith, or took advantage of another's 
weakness (the notion of unconscionability). These situations can be dealt with by other more 
relevant and appropriate legal concepts and not the fiduciary concept. 
The above working definition does not purport to be an all-embracing definition for a 
fiduciary relationship. Indeed, it may be impossible to find such a definition. The submission 
of this paper is that the expectation that a person will act in the interest and for the benefit of 
another, constitutes a necessary and essential ingredient to find for the existence of a fiduciary 
42Scott, "The Fiduciary Principle" (1948) 37 Calif L Rev 539. 
43weinrib, "The Fiduciary Obligation" (1975) 25 UTLJ 1, 4. 
44Shepherd, "Towards A Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationship" (1981) 97 LQR 51, 75. 
45Frankel, "Fiduciary Law" (1983) 71 CalifL Rev 795 , 809. 
46Guerin v Canada DLR (4th) 321, 384. 
47 Above n 27,435. 
48Elders Pastoral Limited v Bank of New Zealand [1989] 2 NZLR 180, 192. 
49For a contrary view that there is no difference in substance between fiduciary duties and other duties, see 
Gautreau, "Demystifying the Fiduciary Mystique" (1989) 68 Can B Rev 1,17.Even then, the writer remarked: 
the only difference is that the degree of power, reliance and vulnerability in relationships that we 
designate as fiduciary is generally greater than in the usual contract or duty of care situations with the 
result that a higher degree of duty and good faith is exacted from the fiduciary and more restrictive rules 
of behaviour are impressed on it. 
Inherent in the above statement is the idea that there is a higher standard of duty imposed on the fiduciary. It is 
submitted that this is a direct consequence of the fiduciary undertaking to act in the interest and for the benefit of 
the beneficiary (representative element) in exercising the power or discretion delegated to him. 
1 2 
relationship. A discussion on the second element - power or discretion exerciseable by that 
person will only be covered in passing in this paper.50 
Cate2ories of Fiduciary 
There are two distinct categories of fiduciary relationships, established mainly for 
practical guidance and administrative convenience. They are: 
Category One: Certain classes of relationships which are analogous to directors 
and corporations, solicitors and clients, trustees and beneficiaries, agents and principals. 51 
There is a long established line of authorities holding that these classes of relationship, because 
of their legal or factual incidents, ordinarily give rise to fiduciary relationships and thus 
fiduciary duties. Therefore, if these classes of relationships are found to exist, there will be a 
presumption of fiduciary obligations. These fiduciary obligations can, however, be rebutted 
with evidence. In this category, the focus is on the identification of the class of relationship.52 
Finn has the following to say: 
Such is the law's perception of the legal relationship itself that it characterises, as a 
matter of course, the purpose of the relationship and the role and reason of one party in 
it as being to promote the interest of the other, or their joint interest, and not its own. 
Trustees, we are told, exist "for the benefit of' the fiduciary; partners contractually bind 
themselves to serve the joint interest within the scope of the partnership business; the 
function of a director is to serve the company's interests .... 53 
50 Above n 27, 488 Dawson J; Ong "Fiduciaries: Identifi cation And Remedies" U Tas L R 311, 316. Ong 
agreed on the representative element - the undertaking to act in the interest and for the benefit of another - as 
establishing the necessary first element. He remarks that a second element of implicit dependence/vulnerability 
on the part of the beneficiary was overlooked by the Court of Appeal in Hospital Products. He states: 
the element creating the fiduciary duty ... and common to all fiduciary situations, is that of implicit 
dependency, objectively expected, by one person upon another in the latters' execution of a special task 
... for the former. 
It is submitted here that the implicit dependence is a direct result of the undertaking or the fiduciary relationship. 
As such, it does not give rise to a relationship . Instead, it should be incorporated into the special power element 
by requiring the power to be one "delegated or entrusted to the fiduciary by the other such that the other is placed 
into a peculiarly vulnerable or dependent situation." 
51 In Hospital Products and United Dominions Corporation Limited v Brian Pry Limited (1985) 60 ALR 741 , 
the Courts found it unnecessary to set up the joint venture as a new fiduciary category. 
52Above n 1, 28. 
53 Above n 4, 33. 
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Category Two: Certain factual situations which give rise to a fiduciary 
expectation that one person is to act in the interests of another in exercising a power delegated 
by that other person. This fiduciary relationship arises out of particular circumstances of the 
case as a matter of fact and not as a result of a particular class of relationship. Thus, a dealing 
between the parties, such as a loan or a sales contract, though not itself fiduciary may 
nevertheless be subject to a fiduciary regulation. 
It is important to note that like the categories of negligence at common law, the category 
of cases in which fiduciary duties and obligations arise from the class of relationship of the 
parties and from the circumstances of particular factual situations are not closed.54 The 
existence of a fiduciary relationship is, after all, a factual enquiry into the circumstances of the 
case to see whether one person acts in the interest of another in the exercise of a delegated 
power or discretion. 
As such, it must be stated that just because some classes of relationship normally 
involve fiduciary obligations, as in Category One, does not mean that they invariably will do 
so. The parties might have changed the rules they would apply. The presumption of fiduciary 
obligations can then be rebutted. On the other hand, a particular class of legal relationship will 
not automatically deny the existence of a fiduciary obligation. Just because some classes of 
relationship do not normally exhibit a fiduciary component does not mean that they will not do 
so in a particular fact situation, as in Category Two. 
It is submitted that this classification is only a useful starting point for analysis. If a 
class of relationship analogous to those in Category One exists, fiduciary obligations will be 
presumed unless rebutted. Otheiwise, the existence of a fiduciary duty will have to be proved 
on the facts. To do so, the court must examine whether one person acts in the interest and for 
the benefit of another in exercising a special power delegated by that other. 
54Elders Pastoral Limited v Bank of New Zealand (1989] 2 NZLR 180,192, Mo gal Corp Limited v Australasia 
Investment Company Limited (25 May 1990, unreported , Auckland High Court , CL 70/87, Smellie J),57-61 , 
Laslcin v Bache & Company 33 BLR (3d) 385. 
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The Incidence of the Fiduciary Duty 
The existence of a fiduciary relationship is the fast step establishing that some fiduciary 
duty is owing to the beneficiary. The next step is to determine what is involved in the fiduciary 
duty - what is the scope, nature, and the standard of the fiduciary duty. It is submitted that the 
incidence of the fiduciary duty provides further support to the requirements of the 
"representative" and "special power" elements before a fiduciary relationship can be found. 
Scope of Duty 
Fiduciary relationships in different situations are of different types carrying different 
obligations depending on the undertaking of the fiduciary which can vary in a number of ways. 
It depends on the interest to be served, the duties to be performed, the standards to be attained , 
and the restrictions to be obeyed, as defined and understood by the parties.55 
A fiduciary relationship does not necessarily connote an all-embracing duty and loyalty 
to the principal for all purposes. The undertaking may be of a general character such as a 
general agency or it may be specific such as to sell a specific asset. Thus a person may be in a 
fiduciary position "quoad part of his activities and not quoad other parts." 56 
To this end, it may be noted that fiduciaries in Category One will generally have a larger 
scope of fiduciary duty than fiduciaries in Category Two. This is because as long as a class of 
relationship is identified to be in Category One, a number of fiduciary obligations will be 
presumed. In Category Two, however, each fiduciary obligation will have to be proved 
individually on the facts. 
Nature of Duty 
A fiduciary owes a duty of loyalty and fidelity to the beneficiary. This means that the 
fiduciary must act solely in the interests of the beneficiary. The fiduciary must avoid all 
conflicts of interest ("no conflict" rule) and not profit from the position entrusted ("no profit" 
rule). 
55aautreau, "Demystifying the Fiduciary Mystique (1989) 68 Can B Rev, 19-20. 
56New Zealand Netherlands Society "Oranje" Incorporated v Kuys (1973) 1 WLR 1126, 1130 (P.C); Hospital 
Products, above n 27,435 per Gibbs CJ; 455, 458 per Mason J; 474 per Deane J; 495 per Dawson J. 
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Further, not only must the fiduciary avoid actual profit or actual conflicts of interest 
from its position as a fiduciary, even the possibility of personal benefit or conflict of interest 
must be avoided. This stringency is designed to keep the relationship pure and to safeguard the 
absolute loyalty of the fiduciary to the beneficiary. If the fiduciary cannot profit, it will not be 
tempted to put self interest before its duty. The court goes a long way to prevent any external 
attack on this concept by prohibiting even the possibility of a potential conflict of interest 
situation, or of fiduciary profiting from his or her position. 
Thus, it is said by Ong 57 that the fiduciary is different from all other obligors because 
it is liable not only for creating an actual conflict between duty and personal interest but also 
for creating a possible conflict between duty and personal interest. 
Standard of Duty 
The nature of the fiduciary duty requires the fiduciary to act selflessly to secure the 
paramount interest of the beneficiary. To this end the standard of the fiduciary duty is high and 
demanding. If a fiduciary derives a profit from the fiduciary position he or she must give up 
the profit to the beneficiary. It is irrelevant that the beneficiary would never have obtained that 
profit or that it could not have been made without the fiduciary's effort or that the beneficiary 
lost nothing. The fairness of the transaction and the good faith of the fiduciary are simply 
irrelevant. 58 
Recently there have been confusion as to when a breach of fiduciary duty arises.59 
There are two approaches to this question, namely, the "prescriptive notion" and the 
"proscriptive notion." The "prescriptive notion" says that fiduciary duty is concerned with 
whether the beneficiary's interests are in fact being served by the fiduciary. If the fiduciary 
ever acts to the detriment of the beneficiary, the fiduciary duty is breached regardless of 
whether the injury caused is outside the confines or the scope of the fiduciary duty or 
concerned with the duty of loyalty and fidelity. 
The alternative view, the "proscriptive notion", sees the duty as concerned with the 
maintenance of loyalty and fidelity to the beneficiary. It is only activated when the fiduciary 
57 "Fiduciaries: Identification and Remedies" U Tas L R 313. 
58Keech v Sandford (1726) Sol Cas T King 61. 
59see above n 4 - Finn, "The Fiduciary Principle" in Youdan (ed) Equity. Fiduciaries and Trusts (1989), 1, 25-
26. 
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seeks improperly to advance his or her own or a third party's interest by exploiting the 
opportunities arising from the fiduciary relationship. 
It is submitted that the latter view, the "proscriptive notion", is the correct one as it 
corresponds with the scope and the nature of fiduciary duty. Fiduciary duty only relates to the 
confine of the fiduciary relationship on matters dealing with the loyalty or fidelity of the 
fiduciary. 
Therefore, it is not the case that the pure negligence of a lawyer, an agent's excess of 
authority, a partner's breach of the partnership contract or a trustee's improvident investment 
are, as such, breaches of fiduciary duty, no matter how harmful they are to the interest of the 
principal. If no issue of disloyalty is involved, such matters will be actionable through those 
primary branches of law which constitute or govern the ordinary incidence of the particular 
relationship in question - negligence, breach of contract, or breach of trust. 
This is well summarised in Re Coomber: Coomber v Coomber: 
All these are cases of fiduciary relations, and the Courts have again and again, in cases 
where there has been a fiduciary relation, interfered and set aside acts which, between 
persons in wholly independent position, would have been perfectly valid. Thereupon 
m some minds there arises the idea that if there is any fiduciary relation whatever any of 
these types of interference is warranted by it. They conclude that every kind of 
fiduciary relation justifies every kmd of interference. Of course that is absurd. The 
nature of the fiduciary relation must be such that it justifies the interference. There is no 
class of cases in which one ought more carefully to bear in mind the facts of the case, 
when one reads the judgment of the Court on those facts, than cases which relate to 
fiduciary and confidential relations and the action of the Court with regard to them.60 
The mcidence of the fiduciary duty - the scope, nature and the standard of fiduciary 
duty, pomts clearly to one common element already identified - that the fiduciary owes a strict 
duty of loyalty or fidelity to the beneficiary. It is submitted that this duty of loyalty or 
fidelity is a direct result of the representative element identifymg the fiduciary relationship - the 
undertaking of the fiduciary to act for the benefit and in the interest of the beneficiary. 
The incidence of the fiduciary duty is in line with and therefore provides further justification for 
the representative element as determinmg the existence of a fiduciary relationship. 
60(1911] Ch 723 (CA) at 728-729. 
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The Concept Of Good Faith 
All consensual behaviours can be represented as different points in a behaviour 
spectrum where on one end there is a completely selfish behaviour and on the other a 
completely selfless behaviour. From one end to the other there is a progression from a selfish 
behaviour to a selfless behaviour. 
The completely selfish behaviour describes a situation where one acts solely in one's 
own interest and for one's own benefit in a dealing with another. This is clearly the case in a 
pre-contractual negotiation where the negotiating parties will attempt to maximise their own 
individual gain or interest. In doing so, the parties act selfishly and solely have regard to their 
several individual interest. 6l 
On the other end, completely selfless behaviour describes a situation where one acts 
selflessly and with undivided loyalty in the interest of another. The model of trustee-
beneficiary is the paradigm for this relationship. However, the completely selfless behaviour 
also includes a situation where one person acts in the joint interest of itself and another. That 
person, in such a case, does not act to conserve its "several or separate" interest, but the "joint 
interest" of itself and another. 
It is crucial to distinguish between a joint interest and a several interest in this 
context. For example, in a pre-partnership negotiation, parties will attempt to serve their own 
"several and separate" interest by attempting to strike the best bargain to each of them 
individually. In contrast, after the partnership is formed, the parties will, instead, act in the 
interest of the partnership, their "joint interest," rather than their individual "several and 
separate" interests. 
Commonwealth jurisdictions have been evolving various standards of protective 
responsibility for the regulation of commercial behaviour. "Unconscionability" and "good 
faith" are two standards developed by courts mainly to temper excessively self interested 
conduct. The notion of unconscionability recognises that one party is entitled to pursue his or 
her own self interests vigorously but, it recognises that for some reasons of special 
disadvantage, the other party may be unable to conserve his or her own interest. Thus, the 
61This is particularly true under the classical contract law where parties have unfettered freedom to enter into 
contract, as the parties have no duty to each other until the magic moment of contract fonnation . RB Gibbens 
"International Corona Resources Limited v Lac Minerals Limited - Where Equity Rushes in" (1987-1988) 13 
Can B L J 482, 489-501. 
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notion of unconscionability seeks to prescribe excessively self-interested or exploitative 
conduct by the stronger party. In such cases, the stronger party has a duty to recommend an 
independent advice to the weaker party and show that the dealing is fair in the circumstances. 
Similarly, the standard of good faith does permit a party to act self interestedly. 
However, the party must also have regard to the legitimate interest of the other. It is a situation 
where one subordinates the regular pursuits of one's individual interest to the maintenance of a 
reasonable community standard in commercial relationships or commercial morality. Finn 
suggests that the good faith standard emcompasses at least three overlapping themes: the 
promotion of co-operation between parties to a relationship; the curtailment of the use of one's 
power over another; and the exaction of "neighbourhood" responsibility in a relationship.62 
Therefore, it seems clear that a fiduciary relationship refers to circumstances 
where a person acts completely selflessly to secure the paramountcy of another's interest or 
their joint interest. In contrast, the notions of unconscionability and good faith relates to the 
mediation of several interests between different parties to a relationship. Finn has put the 
distinction thus: 
[U]nconscionability and good faith ... are ... merely different formulations of a single 
question - a question concerned simply with mediation between the several interests of 
the parties to a relationship. This ... cannot be said of the fiduciary principle. Its 
function is not to mediate between interests. It is to secure the paramountcy of one 
side's interest or in some instances ... of a joint interest.63 
In some recent cases, the courts have employed the 'fiduciary concept in circumstances 
where it would be more appropriate for the notion of unconscionability or good faith to be 
invoked. It is submitted in this paper that in International Corona the lower Courts and the 
minority of the Supreme Court erred in invoking the fiduciary concept in a situation where it is 
more appropriate to invoke the good faith concept. It is understandable that in that case the 
fiduciary concept was employed since the concept of good faith is still undeveloped and has not 
received legal recognition as such. This is particularly true when the concept of good faith is 
used outside the context of the contract as traditionally contract was the battle ground for the 
62Above n 4, 11. Also see Nicholson v Permakraft [1982] NZCLC 95,042. 
63 Above n 4, 27. 
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concept of good faith. Whether it is necessary to give the concept of good faith, at present only 
a moral postulate, legal force is a question of public policy attracting much writing. 64 
Finn submits that unconscionability standard, good faith standard and fiduciary 
standard are three hierarchy of standards in a progression from a selfish behaviour to a selfless 
behaviour. With respect, it is submitted that "unconscionability" and "good faith" standards 
are not hierarchical, in that "good faith" is not necessarily concerned with more selfish conduct 
than "unconscionability" or vice versa. These two are simply different legal justifications to 
curb excessively self interested conduct. In contrast, fiduciary standard is hierarchical with 
good faith standard and unconscionability standard. Fiduciary standard relates to a selfless 
behaviour whereas unconscionability and good faith standards relate to different ways of 
tempering selfish behaviour.65 
V INTERNATIONAL CORONA - FIDUCIARY OR GOOD FAITH? 
In classical contract law, parties to negotiations have no duty to each other until the 
"magic moment" of contract formation. It is only when a contract is ultimately reached that all 
rights and obligations flow including the orthodox contractual tools of undue influence, 
misrepresentation or unconscionability. If the negotiations fail to produce a contract, the 
common law gives little remedy to the injured party for he or she has the ultimate right to 
choose not to contract.66 
In International Corona, the Courts, through the· use of equity, had come close to 
imposing upon negotiating parties a duty of good faith under the guise of fiduciary duty with 
possible recovery for the breach of this duty even if the negotiations fail to produce a contract. 
It is submitted that the majority of the Supreme Court rightly ruled that there was no fiduciary 
relationship between Lac and Corona in their negotiations for a potential joint venture. The trial 
Judge, the Judges in the Ontario Court of Appeal, La Forest J and Wilson J therefore erred in 
holding that there existed a fiduciary relationship. 
64For example see Lucke "Good faith and Contractual Performance" in Finn (ED) Equity and Commercial 
Relationships [1987] 155, Farnsworth, "Precontractua.l Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and 
Failed Negotiations" (1987) 87 Col L Rev 217. 
65see Above n 4 generally. 
66R B Gibbens "International Corona Resources Limited v Lac Minerals Limited - Where Equity Rushes 
in".(1987-1988) 13 Can B L J 482, 489-501. However there have been various inroads made into classical 
contract law including quasi-contract, tort and estoppels. 
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Corona and Lac were negotiating for a potential joint venture. It would be fair to say 
that Lac did not undertake, expressly or impliedly, to act in the interest and for the benefit of 
Corona. Nor was there any evidence to suggest that Lac was expected to act in the interest and 
for the benefit of the intended joint venture. The parties were simply keen to protect and 
conserve their "several" individual interest. With respect to the confidential information, it 
cannot be said that Lac undertook to use the information to purchase the property in the interest 
and for the benefit of Corona; or for their joint interest. The information was disclosed for a 
limited purpose, that of enabling Lac to evaluate the possibility of a joint venture with Corona. 
Lac was not expected to use the information for any other purpose . Besides, Lac was not 
entrusted with or delegated a discretion or power which Lac had to exercise in the interest of 
Corona or the intended joint venture, with the result that Corona was peculiarly vulnerable or 
dependent on Lac's action. 
It is further submitted that there are two broad categories of situation in which a party in 
a negotiation situation may owe a fiduciary duty to the other. The first is where one acts in the 
sole interest and for the sole benefit of the other. This describes a situation where a person in 
the position of Lac undertakes or is expected to purchase the property for Corona. In other 
words, Lac acts as agent for Corona. A breach of this duty will result in Lac holding the 
property solely for Corona. Oddly enough, the lower Courts and the minority of the Supreme 
Court held this to be the result in International Corona in making out a fiduciary duty even 
though on the facts it was agreed that Lac did not undertake nor was it expected to purchase the 
property for Corona. 
The second situation is where one party undertakes or is expected to act in the joint 
interest of itself and the other. This would have been the situation had Lac undertaken or been 
expected to purchase the Williams property for the joint venture. A breach of this duty would 
have resulted in Lac holding the property for Corona and itself. Normally if a party is found to 
be a fiduciary in a negotiation scenario leading to a partnership or a joint venture, the party will 
be held to be a fiduciary for itself and the other - the joint venture or the partnership.67 
It is submitted that the facts of International Corona simply do not fall within either one 
of these situations. 
67nus was essentially the finding in United Dominions Corporation Limited v Brian Pty Limited (1985) 60 
ALR 741, Marr v Arabco Traders Limited (1987) NZBLC 102,732, Fraser Edmiston Pty Ltd v AGT (Old) Pty 
Ltd Unrept 3 June 1986 (Qd SC). 
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It is further suggested that International Corona was concerned with the duty of good 
faith and not fiduciary duty. It is a situation where Lac, while entitled to consider its own 
several and separate interest, was obliged to have regard to the legitimate expectation of 
Corona. Thus, Lac was expected "not to act to the detriment of Corona by having regard to 
Corona's legitimate expectation" rather than "to act in the interest and for the benefit of Corona 
in performing a fiduciary duty." 
The failure of the Judges to make clear the scope and nature of the fiduciary duty owed 
by Lac to Corona shows that there was simply no case for the finding of a fiduciary duty. It is 
not a case where Their Honours did not spell out the incidence of the fiduciary duty, it is a case 
where the incidence could not be spelt out because there was no fiduciary duty. It simply does 
not make sense to say that Lac owed a duty of fidelity or loyalty to Corona in purchasing the 
Williams Property as there was no such expectation or understanding between them. 
Can Commercial Parties be in Fiduciary Relationships 
The fact that an arrangement is of a commercial kind and that the parties to it have dealt 
at arms length has been consistently regarded as an important, almost decisive, factor in 
negativing the existence of a fiduciary duty. This reluctance is understandable since the 
inherent nature of most commercial contracts involve opposing several and separate interests, 
particularly at the stage of contract formation . This is at odds with a loyalty to the other or an 
undertaking to act in the interest of the other which constitutes the core of fiduciary duty. 
These two considerations are mutually exclusive to a point. However, it is important to bear in 
mind that the existence of a fiduciary relationship is a fact specific enquiry. This means that 
negotiating parties might not act in their several and separate interests all the time. Neither is a 
fiduciary required to act in the interests of the beneficiary in every single matter. An absolute 
rule that arms length parties cannot be in fiduciary relationships would be entirely at odds with 
this form of factual enquiry. 
As has been explained by Lahane: 
[T]he distinction between "commercial" and other transactions must be a red herring .. . 
Agencies, partnerships and trusts are established between substantial parties whose 
relationship is undoubtedly "commercial" and who act at arms length .. . the reason why, 
in commercial contexts, transactions outside the traditional categories do not give rise to 
fiduciary duties is that most transactions do not, as a matter of fact, satisfy the criteria 
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(whatever precisely they are) which lead courts to characterise a relationship between 
private parties as fiduciary. It is because they do not satisfy the criteria not because 
they are commercial, that such transactions do not usually carry with them fiduciary 
duties and the remedies following from a breach of such duties.68 
The Court of Appeal in International Corona rightly held against any absolute rnle that 
barred the operation of fiduciary obligations in arms length commercial negotiation. The Court 
relied on the "fact specific enquiry" of a fiduciary relationship and the High Court of 
Australia's decision in United Dominions Corp Limited v Brian Pty Limited ("UDC").69 The 
real question was did the facts give rise to a fiduciary relationship between Lac and Corona? 
This would also seem to be the general consensus of the Judges in the Supreme Court. 
I shall now proceed to a close textual analysis of the various judgments by the Court of 
Appeal and the Judges in the Supreme Court in International Corona. Particular attention will 
be given to the reasons why the Judges found or did not find an existence of a fiduciary duty. 
It is also to be shown that the failure of the Judges in making clear the scope of the fiduciary 
duty clearly suggests that there was no fiduciary relationship between Corona and Lac. 
The Courts' Findin2 on Fiduciarv Relationships 
The Court of Appeal held that there was a fiduciary duty between Lac and Corona 
which Lac had breached. By a majority of three (Sopinka J with Lamer and McIntyre JJ 
concurring) to two (La Forest and Wilson JJ), the Supreme Court of Canada refused to find 
any fiduciary obligation on Lac to refrain from securing the Williams property for itself. 
The Court Of Appeal 
The Court of Appeal identified four factors which suggested that a fiduciary 
relationship existed between Corona and Lac.70 They are: 
(i) Lac sought out Corona in pursuing the joint venture; 
68Lebane "Fiduciaries in a Commercial Context" in Essays in Equity Finn (ed) (1984) 104. 
69(1986) 59 A1JR 676. In UDC, though technically without a contract, the joint venturers bad already reached 
an informal arrangement to assume the relationship and had proceeded to take steps towards its implementation. 
Therefore, arguably, the decision in UDC applied the widely known rule that joint venturers are in a fiduciary 
relationship to each other to an existing de facto joint venture agreement which eventually emerged as a full 
fledged joint venture. 
70Above o 1, 64. Above n 3, 636-646. 
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(ii) Corona divulged confidential information to Lac during the negotiations; 
(iii) There was a practice in the mining industry that negotiating parties do not act 
to the detriment of each other; 
(iv) The negotiating parties seemed to have had a mutual understanding of how 
each would conduct itself in their negotiations when working towards one 
common objective. 
It is indeed difficult to see from these factors how Lac could be said to act in the interest 
and for the benefit of Corona; or alternatively for the benefit of the intended joint venture. All 
of the factors were instances of the negotiations which suggest that Lac should act in good faith 
by having regard to Corona's legitimate interest. Thus, Lac was not "to act to the detriment of 
Corona". 
The fourth factor suggests that the parties were working towards one common 
objective. However, this is a vague statement and is quite different from saying that the parties 
would act in the joint interest of the potential joint venture. Besides, the remedy awarded to 
Corona - that Lac were to hold the property on constructive trust for Corona alone is at odds 
with this analysis. If it is right that the parties were "working towards one common objective" 
and thus each was a fiduciary for the potential joint venture, Lac would have held the property 
on a constructive trust for the joint benefit of Corona and itself. 
Wilson J 
In the Supreme Court, Wilson J found the existence of a fiduciary duty on grounds 
very different from that relied on in the lower Courts and by La Forest J. Her Honour held that 
"while no ongoing fiduciary relationship arose between the parties by virtue only of their arm's 
length negotiation ... a fiduciary duty arose in Lac when Corona made available to Lac its 
confidential information concerning the Williams property," and thus "Lac became ... subject 
to a fiduciary duty with respect to that information not to use it for its own use or benefit."71 
Her Honour's decision on the finding of a fiduciary relationship was premised on the 
presence of confidentiality between Lac and Corona, rather than the negotiations towards a 
71Above n 1, 16. 
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potential joint venture. This raises the question whether the duty of confidentiality necessarily 
entails the existence of a fiduciary relationship. Gurry remarks that "the obligation of 
confidence can itself be regarded as a fiduciary obligation which defines for its own purposes 
its own class of fiduciary. "72 If this is true, every case of breach of confidence will also be a 
breach of fiduciary duty. The question is complicated by the fact that the misuse of confidential 
information is frequently a feature of a breach of fiduciary obligations. These two duties, 
however, were treated as quite separate issues by all other Judges in International Corona. 
They were said to be "while intertwined, distinct to a certain extent."73 It was also pointed out 
by Gurry that: 
In a breach of confidence action , the court's concern is for the protection of a 
confidence which has been created by the disclosure of confidential information by the 
confider to the confidant. The court's attention is thus focused on the protection of the 
confidential information because it has been the medium for the creation of a 
relationship of confidence; its attention is not [as in fiduciary relationships] focused on 
the information as a medium by which a pre-existing duty is breached.74 
However this is not an entirely satisfactory explanation for the distinction between a 
duty of confidentiality and fiduciary duty because it could be argued that the disclosure of 
information creates a fiduciary duty and the misuse of the information is a breach of that 
fiduciary duty. It is submitted that what really creates a fiduciary duty is the representative 
element and power element referred to before. 
The disclosure of the information to Lac by Corona does not result in an expectation in 
the parties that Lac was to use that information for the sole benefit and interest of Corona; or 
alternatively the intended joint venture. Indeed, it was disclosed to enable Lac to evaluate in its 
own several and separate interest in taking part in the joint venture with Corona. Further, there 
was no power or discretion delegated to Lac by Corona. ~ that was passed over to Lac by 
Corona was the confidential information. 
72Above n 7, 159. 
73 Above n 1, 63. 
74Gurry Breach of Confidence (1984), 161-162. 
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La Forest J 
La Forest J noted that a fiduciary relationship does not normally arise between 
commercial parties in an arms length transaction. However, His Honour held that there were 
three factors in International Corona which supported the finding that Corona "should 
reasonably expect Lac not to act to Corona's detriment by acquiring the Williams property. "75 
This finding led the Judge to find a fiduciary relationship between Corona and Lac. The 
factors were: 
( 1) Trust and confidence; 
(2) Industry practice; and 
(3) Vulnerability. 
Trust and Confidence: The relationship between Corona and Lac was said to be 
one of trust and confidence.76 They were negotiating in good faith towards some joint venture 
relationship, and it was expected during these negotiations that confidential information would 
be disclosed. 
Industry Practice: This appears to be the most significant factor in the lower courts 
and La Forest J's finding for a fiduciary relationship.77 La Forest J. held that the industry 
practice imposed a "duty" on parties in serious negotiations not to act to the other party's 
detriment through the misuse of confidential information. His Honour remarked that the issue 
was not, as submitted by Lac, what is the legal effect of custom in the industry, but what is the 
importance of the existence of such practice in determining whether Corona could reasonably 
expect that Lac would refrain from acting against Corona's interest.78 
Vulnerability: His Honour further found that vulnerability was not a necessary 
ingredient in every fiduciary relationship, though it was normally required in determining 
whether a new class of relationship should be taken to give rise to a fiduciary obligation.79 His 
75Above n 1, 35-44. 
76Above n 1, 35-37. 
77 Above n 1, 37-39. 
78It is doubtful whether there is a real distinction between these two tags. Even if there is a distinction, it 
would be semantic. 
79 Above n 1, 39-42. 
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Honour noted that a fiduciary obligation can be breached without harm being inflicted on the 
beneficiary as in Keech v Sandford.80 His Honour continued: 
Not only is actual harm not necessary, susceptibility to harm will not be present in 
many cases. Each director of General Motors owes a fiduciary duty to that company, 
but one can seriously question whether General Motors is vulnerable to the action of 
each and every director...the issue should be whether one party stands in relation to 
another such that it could reasonably be expected that the other would act or refrain 
from acting in a way contrary to the interests of that other.81 
In any event, His Honour thought it beyond doubt that on the facts, Corona was 
vulnerable to Lac. To countenance the view that Corona did not give up to Lac any power or 
discretion to affect its interest, 82 His Honour held that Lac acquired a power or ability to harm 
Corona by obtaining the Williams property. Corona gave Lac that power by giving up 
information about the property and about Corona's intention. 
It is submitted that His Honour's analyses have a number of difficulties. 
Trust and confidence: The fact that the parties were negotiating in good faith 
towards some joint venture relationship is more in line with the doctrine of good faith. As 
noted before, it is clear from the evidence that in a pre-contractual negotiation each party did not 
act in the interest, or for the benefit of the other; or alternatively for their joint interest. Instead, 
the parties acted in their several and separate interest and for their several and separate benefit in 
achieving the best bargain for themselves. 
Industry practice: It may be true that industry practice imposed a duty on parties in 
serious negotiations not to act to the other party's detriment. However, this expectation not to 
act to each other's detriment is not sufficient to find a fiduciary duty. The fiduciary expectation 
has to be such that one party will act, without having regard to its several self interest in the 
interest and for the benefit of the other, or for their joint interest. 
Vulnerability: It is interesting to note that, contrary to La Forest J's opinion, the 
beneficiary in Keech v Sandford was clearly vulnerable to the act of the trustee though the 
80(1726) Sel Cas Ting 61. 
81Above n 1, 40. 
82see Sopinka J's judgment, above n 1, 35. 
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breach in question did not cause any harm to the beneficiary. Besides, a corporation is of 
course vulnerable to the action of its directors as each director has an actual or apparent 
authority to bind the corporation. 
However, it is submitted that vulnerability is not an element leading to a fiduciary 
relationship. Rather it is a characteristic of the result of the fiduciary relationship. It is the 
natural result of the reliance placed by the beneficiary on the undertaking given by the 
fiduciary. As such, it should not be a "conclusive" test to determine the existence or otherwise 
of a fiduciary relationship. As submitted earlier, it is useful only to the extent that it evidences 
the essential element that one person undertakes to act in the interest of another in the exercise 
of a discretionary power. 
Further, it is difficult to see how a fiduciary power or discretion was entrusted to Lac 
simply by Corona's giving up the confidential information about the property and about 
Corona's intention to acquire the property. The observation by La Forest has significantly 
watered down the degree of trust and reliance involved in a fiduciary relationship. 
La Forest J. held there to be a fiduciary relationship because all the factors mentioned 
above pointed to a reasonable expectation on the part of Corona that "Lac should not act to the 
detriment of Corona". This, as has been submitted repeatedly in this paper, is not a fiduciary 
expectation. To find a fiduciary relationship, there must be a reasonable expectation that Lac 
would act for the benefit and in the interest of Corona or in the joint interest of Corona and Lac, 
the potential joint venture, in exercising a power delegated by the beneficiary. 
Sopinka J (Lamer And McIntyre JJ Concurring) 
Delivering the judgment for the majority on this point in the Supreme Court, Sopinka J 
held that the Courts below had departed from a salutary rule that fiduciary duties are normally 
not required in the context of an arms length transaction because the parties have an adequate 
opportunity to prescribe their own mutual obligations. Besides, the contractual remedies 
available to them to obtain compensation from any breach of those obligations should be 
sufficient. This is so as "equity's blunt tool must be reserved for situations that are truly in 
need of special protection that equity affords" .83 
83 Above n 1, 60. 
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His Honour went on to cite various cases as authority for the proposition that 
vulnerability is the hallmark for the identification of a fiduciary relationship; and held that the 
Courts below erred in not giving sufficient weight to this essential ingredient of dependency or 
vulnerability. 
Confidential information: To the above proposition that vulnerability is the 
hallmark of fiduciary relationship, His Honour added a qualification that "the presence of 
conduct that incurs the censure of a court of equity in the context of a fiduciary duty cannot 
itself create the duty" .84 In applying this qualification, His Honour found the fact that 
confidential information is obtained and misused cannot itself create and breach a fiduciary 
obligation. Thus, though a 
possible incident of a fiduciary relationship is the exchange of confidential information 
and restrictions on its use. Where, however, the essence of the complaint is misuse of 
confidential information, the appropriate cause of action ... .is breach of confidence and 
not breach of fiduciary duty.85 
Industry practice: Sopinka J went on to discuss the finding that there is a mining 
industry practice that imposed an obligation on parties in serious negotiations not to act to the 
detriment of each other.86 His Honour felt the finding was not supported by sufficient 
evidence. Besides, even assuming that the practice was established, His Honour disagreed that 
a fiduciary duty arose by virtue of that practice. The learned Judge stated: 
It is understandable that, in a contract setting, a practice that is notorious and clearly 
defined and relevant to the business under discussion should be incorporated as a term. 
It can readily be inferred that the parties agreed to it. It is a considerable leap from this 
principle to erect a fiduciary relationship on the basis of such a practice. No authority 
was cited to the court that this concept can be transplanted in this fashion. 87 
Vulnerability: His Honour distinguished UDC on the ground that the beneficiary in 
that case was at the mercy of the fiduciary's discretion. It was said that on the facts of 
84Above n 1, 63. 
85 Above n I, 64. 
86Above n 1, 68-69. 
87 Above n 1, 67. 
29 
International Corona, the parties had not advanced beyond the negotiation stage. In addition, 
Corona did not "confer on Lac any discretionary power to acquire the Williams property."88 
His Honour then concluded that the vital ingredient of dependency or vulnerability was 
entirely lacking in the case.89 The parties were said to be experienced mining promoters who 
had ready access to geologists, engineers and lawyers. The fact that the parties were anxious 
to make a deal cannot attract the special attention of equity. If Corona placed itself in a 
vulnerable position because Lac was given confidential information, then His Honour thought 
this dependency was gratuitously incurred. Nothing prevented Corona from exacting an 
undertaking from Lac that it would not acquire the Williams property unilaterally. His Honour 
concluded: 
Accordingly, if Corona gave up confidential information, it did so without obtaining 
any contractual protection which was available to it. This and the fact that misuse of 
confidential information is the subject of an alternative remedy strongly militates against 
the application here of equity's blunt tooI.90 
It is submitted that though His Honour arrived at a correct result, His Honour failed to 
consider a number of additional reasons on which the finding that no fiduciary duty existed 
could have been based. 
Confidential Information: It is submitted that a fiduciary relationship could not be 
found on the facts of International Corona in respect of the confidential information. This is so 
not because of the reason given by His Honour that to do so would mean the fact that 
confidential information is obtained and misused both creates a fiduciary obligation and the 
breach. To overcome His Honour's objections it can be said that the disclosure of information 
created the fiduciary duty and the misuse of the information created the breach. However this 
cannot be the basis to find a fiduciary relationship. A fiduciary relationship cannot be found on 
the ground of the disclosure of information because there was no fiduciary expectation that Lac 
was to use the information for the benefit and in the interests of Corona. Further, there was 
also no power or discretion delegated by Corona to Lac to use the information to that end. 
88Above n 1, 65 . 
89Above n 1, 68-69. 
90Above n 1, 69. 
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Industry Practice: It is important to note that a fiduciary relationship cannot be 
found because the standard of industry practice in International Corona merely established an 
expectation that Lac was not to act to the detriment of Corona. It did not generate a fiduciary 
expectation that Lac was to act in Corona's interest. In other words, the fiduciary relationship 
was found not to exist not because of "the considerable leap to erect a fiduciary relationship on 
the basis of a notorious and well accepted practice" but because the practice did not establish 
that Lac was to act for Corona's benefit. Therefore it can be said that if the practice established 
that Lac were to act in the interest and for the benefit of Corona, the "considerable leap" will be 
permitted "to erect a fiduciary relationship." 
Vulnerability: As submitted above, vulnerability is the natural result of a fiduciary 
relationship where one party places reliance on the undertakings given by the fiduciary, rather 
than an element giving rise to the relationship. His Honour's view that the parties could have 
protected their interest via a confidentiality agreement and since they did not do so, a fiduciary 
duty would not be imposed - should not be adopted. La Forest J remarked that the Court 
should not deny the existence of a fiduciary obligation simply because the parties could, by 
means of a confidential agreement, have regulated their affairs. La Forest J. continued: 
I cannot understand why a claim for breach o( confidence is available absent a 
confidentiality agreement, but a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is not. The fact that 
the parties could have concluded a contract to cover a situation but did not in fact do so 
does not, in my opinion, determine that matter ... The existence of an alternative 
procedure is only relevant if the parties would realistically have been expected to 
contemplate it as an altemative.91 
His Honour then concluded that it was not established that the entering of confidential 
agreement was an expected course of action in the industry. 
It is submitted that the operation of fiduciary duty should be treated the same as tortious 
duties. The position is that while a contract produces contractual duties, it will not exclude the 
generation of tortious duties unless the contract either expressly or impliedly excludes such 
duties. There is no difference in principle between the operation of fiduciary law and law of 
tort in this respect. Therefore, the approach shown by the courts when dealing with the 
contract-tort relationships should also be used when dealing with the contract-fiduciary 
relationships. In both cases, there are simply additional duties, or duties that differ in quality, 
91 Above n 1, 41. 
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over and above the contractual duties. 92 It is important to recall that the reason for the 
imposition of fiduciary principle is that fundamental decency and honour personal and 
commercial affairs is something to be valued, and is therefore imposed by the law according 
to the circumstances. 
Summary 
The holding of the majority in the Supreme Court that there is no fiduciary relationship 
on the facts of International Corona is clearly the right one. However, as demonstrated, Their 
Honours' reasons are fraught with no less difficulties compared to the minority's reasonings. 
As a result of International Corona it might be that vulnerability, rightly or wrongly, by design 
or by accident, would be regarded as the hallmark for the identification of a fiduciary 
relationship.93 It is submitted that this approach is not to be welcomed. 
A more vigorous objection should be made to the use of the fiduciary concept by the 
lower Courts and the minority Judges in the Supreme Court. It is submitted that this 
inappropriate invocation of the fiduciary concept will perpetuate the confusion about the 
fiduciary concept despite tremendous efforts by various judges and writers to render the 
concept certain. 
Finally, it is submitted that the fiduciary undertaking - an expectation that one is to act 
in the interest and for the benefit of another - must be present before a fiduciary relationship can 
be found to exist. It is likely that this is not the only element, but it is submitted in this paper 
that it is an essential and indispensable element. 
VI RESTITUTIONARY REMEDY - CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST 
General 
There are two important observations to be made about the judgment of the majority (La 
Forest J (Lamer J concurring) and Wilson J) in International Corona on the issue of remedy.94 
92Above n 28, 14. 
93 Above n 1, 63. 
94see Grant Hammond, "Equity and Abortive Commercial Transactions" (1990) 106 LQR 207. 
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The first is that, as a result of fusion of law and equity, there is now a flexible and liberal 
judicial attitude to remedies. This is coined the "remedial flexibility". 95 It means the 
considerations that justify an initial liability are now dissociated from those considerations that 
lead to a particular remedy. Remedies are therefore "at large" in a real sense not depending on 
the existence of some particular liability. 
The second point is that, as an instance demonstrating the first point, the remedy of 
constructive trust is dissociated from the requirement of a pre-existing property right and a pre-
existing fiduciary relationship. 95a It seems the time is now ripe for an argument that a simple 
breach of common law duty, such as a contract, may result in a remedy of constructive trust.96 
The "Remedial Flexibility" 
The rationale for the first observation is simply that now with a fusion of law and 
equity, the jurisdictional basis of a cause of action no longer dictates the form of remedy 
available. Wilson J remarked that the choice of an appropriate remedy should not in these days 
be in1peded by the historic divide between equity and common law.97 
This means that if a ground of liability is established, the remedy that follows should be 
the one that is most appropriate on the facts of the case rather than one confined by legal history 
or over-categorisation. While considerable certainty is required in establishing an initial 
liability so that parties are aware of their duties and act accordingly, the certainty of remedy 
should not be accorded as high a priority. This will enable the court to award a remedy which 
is most appropriate on the facts of the case. There is simply no need "to pass the facts through 
further conceptual loops" before a particular remedy is awarded. This is the prevailent 
approach of the Canadian Courts; and it is echoed in the approach recently adopted by the New 
Zealand Courts, especially the Court of Appeal. 
The impact of "remedial flexibility" brought by the intermingling of law and equity was 
evidenced in New Zealand in Day v Mead,98 Gilles v Keogh 99 and more recently in 
95Above n 1, 47. 
95a Re Diplock (1948] Ch 465 . 
96Elders Pastoral Limited v Bank of New Zealand [1989] 2 NZLR 180 can be explained on this ground. Also 
see Birks, "Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: ~ and The Fusion of Law in Equity" (1987] 
Lloyd's Mar & Com LQ 421. 
97Above n 1, 17. 
98(1987] 2 NZLR 448. 
99(1989] 2 NZLR 327. 
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Aquaculture Corp v The New Zealand Green Mussel Company Limited.100 In Aquaculture the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal remarked that "for all purposes material, equity and common 
law are mingled or merged" 101 with the result that "a full range of remedies should be available 
as appropriate, no matter whether they originated in common law, equity or statute." 1
02 
In that case, compensatory damages were ordered for an action for a breach of 
confidence. Further, Their Honours saw no reason in principle why exemplary damages 
should not be awarded for an actionable breach of confidence in a case where a compensatory 
award would not adequately reflect the gravity of the defendant's conduct. In Aquaculture, 
however, exemplary damages were not necessary. 
It is submitted that the New Zealand Courts went even further than the Canadian Courts 
in responding to the impact of the fusion of law and equity has on the availability of remedy. 
In Canada, even though as a general rule the availability of a particular remedy does not depend 
on a particular cause of action, it still depends on the existence of some wider ground of 
liability. In New Zealand, the Courts adopted a "Chancellor's foot" approach where the 
availability of a remedy depends on what is just and reasonable in the view of the Courts. 
For example, as will be seen later in this paper, the remedy of constructive trust is only 
granted in Canada if a restitutionary claim can be made out and if the constructive trust remedy 
is most appropriate on the facts. In contrast, a New Zealand Court will grant a constructive 
trust as long as it is "fair" or"just and reasonable" to do so. 
Constructive Trust 
This "remedial flexibility" - the flexibility in granting a remedy, was demonstrated in 
International Corona by the majority's treatment of the availability of constructive trnst. La 
Forest J (Lamer J concurring), in giving the leading judgment on the point of remedy, stated 
that though there was no unanimous agreement on the circumstances in which a constructive 
trust would be imposed, no special relationship or fiduciary relationship, between the parties is 
necessary. The learned Judge said that insistence on a special relationship would undoubtedly 
lead a court, in coming to the conclusion that a proprietary remedy was the only appropriate 
result, "manufacturing special relationships out of thin air, so as to justify their conclusion." 
103 
lOOcA 69/87 11 June 1990 (NZCA). 
lOl Above n 100, 5 per Cooke P. (Richardson, Bisson, Hardie Boys JJJ concurring). 
102 Above n 100, 6. 
l03Above n 1, 50. 
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La Forest J also added that constructive trust is not reserved only for a situation where 
a pre-existing right of property is recognised. It is clear that to do so would be limiting the 
constructive trust to its institutional function, and deny it the status of a remedy which is its 
more important role. 104 His Honour accepted that the imposition of a constructive trust can 
both recognise and create a right of property, endorsing the view advocated by Goff and Jones. 
The learned authors state: 
[A] constructive trust should be imposed if it is just to grant the plaintiff the additional 
benefits which flow from the recognition of a right of property .105 
Interestingly, Sopinka J cited the above passage to support His Honour's view that a 
constructive trust is ordinarily reserved for those situations where a right of property is 
recognised.'' 106 
Traditionally there has also been a tendency to confuse the distinct remedy of equitable 
tracing with the constructive trust, with the result that the development of the constructive trust 
has been hindered. The tracing remedy is, unlike constructive trust, a means to obtain specific 
recovery of a property. It can only be used when the plaintiff held a beneficial interest in 
property and where the property remained identifiable in the defendant's hands. In contrast, 
the proprietary interest associated with the remedial constructive trust arises, for the first tin1e, 
as a result of the imposition of trust. Many writers and judges see the remedy of constructive 
trust as a legal tool to give priority to certain plaintiffs. 107 
The constructive trust is a remedy as well as an institution. As such, it is submitted that 
a pre-existing right of property is not necessary when it is used as a remedy. 
Further, it is a basic thesis of this paper that a fiduciary relationship should not be 
required as a pre-requisite for the imposition of constructive trust. To do so would perpetuate a 
judicial reasoning which is circular and fictional. It compounds the confusion of the fiduciary 
concept and misdirects the proper enquiry of why a constructive trust should be imposed in a 
particular situation. In dropping the requirement for a special relationship, the fiduciary 
l04Above n 1, 50. 
105The Law of Restitution (3 ed) (1986) 673. 
106Above n 1, 75. 
l07navid Paciocco, "The Remedial Constructive Trust: A Principled Basis for Priorities over Creditors" (1989) 
Can B Rev 315. 
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concept will be saved for the genuinely trust-like relationship. A proper enquiry can be 
directed to the facts of the cases to see why the remedy of constructive trust is appropriate. 
Only then the criteria to be taken into account in granting the constructive trust can be 
ascertained, developed and accordingly followed by other courts. 
It is further submitted that the New Zealand Courts should adopt the Canadian position 
as demonstrated in International Corona. This sets out a two stage enquiry before a 
constructive trust could be imposed. First, the court determines whether it has the jurisdiction 
to award constructive trust. The court has that jurisdiction if a claim for unjust enrichment or a 
restitutionary claim is made out. The second question relates to the exercise of this jurisdiction. 
Even though a court has jurisdiction to grant the remedy of constructive trust, it needs not 
exercise this jurisdiction. It depends on the particular circumstances of the case. It will be 
suggested later that the court should develop some practical guidelines as to situations where it 
will exercise the jurisdiction to grant a constructive trust remedy. 
The Requirement of Fiduciary Relationships 
The requirement for a fiduciary relationship before a constructive trust can be imposed 
reflects a lack of confidence of the courts over the scope of equity's jurisdiction. It is in part a 
common law victory in the historical tension between Common law courts and Chancery courts 
in their competitions for jurisdiction. This limitation was imposed to limit the operation of the 
equitable remedy of constructive trust to equity's traditional jurisdiction - fiduciary 
relationships - as it is a traditional basis for the intervention of equity. 
Consequently, the fiduciary label was used to achieve a remedial end as the remedy of 
constructive trust, considered to be appropriate in certain circumstances, would not be available 
unless a fiduciary relationship was present. In this sense the fiduciary label imposes no 
obligation but is merely instrumental in achieving what appears to be the appropriate result . 
This is criticised as a situation where one "argues from a conclusion to a duty and then 
back to the conclusion" which "reads equity backwards" .108 Professor Birks describes it thus: 
[I]t moves the characterisation of a relationship as fiduciary from the reasoning which 
justify a conclusion to the conclusion itself: a relationship becomes fiduciary because a 
l08Above n 1, 32. 
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legal consequence traditionally associated with that label is generated by the facts in 
question. 109 
Further, the past emphasis on the fiduciary relationship has played a major role in 
impeding the development of the constructive trust along remedial lines. It has prompted the 
courts, in considering whether a constructive trust should be imposed, to place a primary 
significance on the abuse of a relationship between the parties (institutional approach), 
rather than upon the wrongful nature of the act or events through which the property 
was acquired and retained. 
This judicial habit of manufacturing a fiduciary relationship so that a remedy of 
constructive trust can be imposed should not be perpetuated. The Canadian Courts have 
abandoned this approach, and the New Zealand Courts have made a start in a similar direction. 
The courts should openly admit that whenever the plaintiff should be able to assert a 
proprietary right, the remedy of constructive trust should be awarded. The fact is simply that 
the plaintiffs claim has a proprietary base and thus a proprietary remedy is called for. The 
existence or otherwise of a fiduciary relationship should be irrelevant. Only then can proper 
enquiries be directed to identify precisely what this proprietary base is - in other words - what 
factors justify the award of a constructive trust. The Canadian Courts are currently working on 
this principled approach to the award of constructive trust. It is hoped that the New Zealand 
Court will follow this development closely. 
The New Zealand Approach 
In Elders Pastoral the New Zealand Court of Appeal recently held that it is no longer 
necessary to show a fiduciary relationship before the imposition of a constructive trust. Both 
Cooke P (Richardson J concurring) and Somers J found that all that was required was for the 
plaintiff to show that it would be against "conscience" for the defendant to retain the asset in the 
face of the plaintiffs claim, or that it is "just and reasonable" that a constructive trust be 
imposed. llO However, Somers J had already found that there was an obligation "fiduciary in 
character" between the parties imposing a duty to account for the proceeds of sale - therefore it 
is unclear whether his adoption of the unconscionability test was ratio or obiter.
111 
109Peter Birks, "Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: ~ and the Fusion of Law and Equity" 
(1987) 2 Lloyd's Mar & Com LQ 421. 
llOElders Pastoral Limited v Bank of New Zealand [1989) 2 NZLR 180, 186. 
lllAbove n 110,192. 
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Cooke P quoted Snell's Principles of Equity which states: 
A constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of equity finds 
expression. When property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of 
the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts 
him into a trustee. 112 
This, in essence, was repeated in a much quoted judgment of Dean J in Hospital 
Product: 
[T]he constructive trust ... should properly be seen as [giving] equitable relief 
appropriate to the particular circumstances of the case rather than as arising from a 
breach of some fiduciary duty flowing from an identified fiduciary relationship ... in all 
the circumstances, [the constructive trust was imposed] in accordance with the principle 
under which a constructive trust may be imposed ... in circumstances where a person 
could not in good conscience retain for himself a benefit.. .. 113
 
It is a suggestion of this paper that while the dissociation of fiduciary requirement from 
the imposition of the constructive trust is to be welcomed, the Court of Appeal in Elders 
Pastoral failed to provide any coherent basis or guidelines as to when it would be 
"conscionable" or "just and reasonable" for the remedy of constructive trust to be awarded. 
Opinion in close cases often suggests that the decision to grant a constructive trust is based 
mainly on an instinctive feeling that this relief should be allowed. While it may be conceded 
that a case-by-case approach has, on the whole, provided a satisfactory resolution of specific 
problems, the absence of a systematic approach has led to too much uncertainty. It results in a 
serious and growing confusion in analysis, a lack of overall intelligibility and much difficulty 
in prediction. It is submitted that the view that a constructive trust remedy can be imposed 
whenever it is "just" to do so affords little, if any, practical guidance unless indications can be 
given as to what those situations may be. In La Forest J's language: 
[T]o allow such a result would be to leave the determination of property rights to "some 
mix of judicial discretion ... subjective views about which party 'ought to win' ... and 
'the formless void of individual moral opinion."' 114 
112(28th ed) at 192. Also quoted in Neste Oy v Lloyds Banlc Pie [1983) 2 Lloyds Rep 658 . 
l l3 Above n 27, 496. 
114Above n 1, 51. His Honour quoted the observation by Deane Jin Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 
583, 616. 
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Therefore, it is submitted in this paper that the New Zealand Courts should adopt the 
Canadian approach to determine whether the remedy of constructive trust should be awarded. 
The constructive trust would be available when a restitutionary claim can be made out. If the 
claim were made out, an enquiry would then be directed into the appropriateness of awarding 
the remedy of constructive trust in the particular case, having regard to certain factors, such as 
the adequacy of other personal remedies, the conduct of the parties and other special 
considerations that are discussed later in this paper. 
The Canadian Approach 
The Claim for Unjust Enrichment 
As noted earlier, the Canadian Courts 115 approach the question of whether a remedial 
constructive trust should be imposed in a particular situation in two steps. First, the Courts 
consider whether a claim for unjust enrichment is established. Then, they examine whether in 
the circumstances a constructive trust is the most appropriate remedy to redress that unjust 
enrichment. 116 
To make out a claim for unjust enrichment, 116a it has to be established that: 
( 1) a party has been enriched; 
(2) that enrichment was at another party's expense; and 
(3) that enrichment was unjust. 
Restitution will often be the appropriate response if this claim is made out. By 
restitution, I mean giving back to someone either the property that has been taken from that 
person (a restitutionary proprietary remedy), or its equivalent value (a personal restitutionary 
remedy). 
l 15see Hunter Engineering Company v Syncrude Canada Limited 57 DLR (4th) 321. 
l l6see Above n 1 generally La Forest J and Sopinka J's judgments. 
l l6a For the generic conception of the law of Unjust Enrichment see Birks An Introduction To The Law o
f 
Restitution (1985) 
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Though the principle of unjust enrichment was already established as a ground of 
liability in Canada, its limits remain to be developed and probed. In particular, it is the third 
element which the court would have to refine and develop as cases haphazardly come before 
the courts. 117 The enrichment must be "unjustified" in order to entitle the plaintiff to the 
remedy. This means an absence of "juristic reason" for the enrichment. As such, the 
determination that the enrichment is unjust does not refer to abstract notions of morality and 
justice, but flows directly from the finding that there was a breach of a legally recognised and 
enforceable duty_ 118 
For a proprietary relief - a remedial constructive trust, 
119 it is obvious that some 
connection or nexus must be shown between the acquisition of property by the respondent and 
the corresponding deprivation of the claimant. The question was said to be whether the 
claimant could reasonably expect to receive an actual interest in the property and whether the 
respondent ought reasonably to have been cognisant of that expectation. 
120 By ordering a 
proprietary relief there is a clear risk that the interests of a bona fide third party may be 
prejudiced. 
Constructive trust can remedy other wrongs besides unjust enrichment. This is known 
as the non-restitutionary constructive trust. 121 As a general rule, claims for breach of contract 
or breach of an expressed trust are not restitutionary, though in some cases the measure of 
liability may fortuitously tum out to be restitutionary. Constructive trusts imposed for breach of 
duties of an express trustee or trustee de son tort, constructive trusts arising in respect of 
consensual arrangements between vendors and purchasers of land, and between mortgagees 
and mortgagors; and constructive trusts imposed to perfect imperfect gifts or instruments are 
not restitutionary, since they do not remedy unjust enrichment. There is no enrichment since 
the prope1ty is, in equity, vested in the claimant as from the time the arrangement is entered 
into. 
Where there has been a contractual dealing between the claimant and the respondent, 
and the respondent has been enriched as a result of the contractual relationship, there should be 
no finding of unjust enrichment. Unjust Enrichment can exist only where there is no juristic 
ll 7 Goff and Jones The Law of Restitution(3ed) (1986) 30. 
l 18However, new causes of action and duties may be created for this purpose. 
l 19'Jne respondent will also be personally liable in the same way as a fiduciary or an express trustee. 
l20sorochan v Sorochan (1986] 2 SCR 38, 52-53 per Dickson J. 
121 David Hayton, "Constructive Trust: Is the Remedying of Unjust Enrichment Satisfactory Approach?" In 
Youdan (ed) Equity, Fiduciaries and Trust (1989), 205. 
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reason accounting for the enrichment of the respondent and the corresponding deprivation of 
the claimant. A contract, in such a case, provides the juristic reason rendering any 
restitutionary claim unavailable. However, the mere fact that parties are involved in a 
contractual relationship does not necessarily preclude the application of the remedial 
constructive trust, since the existence of the contract may not account for the enrichment in 
question. Thus, if there is an overpayment arising out of a contractual relationship, the 
remedial constructive trust may be appropriate to capture the overpayment, for it is not 
explained juristically by the terms of the contract. 
However, there are judicial observations from high places 
122 holding that the remedial 
constructive trust may be available when there is a "bad faith" breach of contract. Birks argues 
that in certain circumstances, even if the contract accounts for the enrichment, a proprietary 
restitutionary remedy - constructive trust may be available.
123 The main objection to this is 
from the disciples of the theory of "efficient breach." This theory, in essence, says that if by 
compensating the contractual party, one can still break the contract profitably, it is good that 
one should do so. This means that performance of the contract is directed to the point at which 
it is most valued. Birks regards this as no more than an attempt to clothe a remedial deficiency 
as an economic virtue. l24 
The Appropriateness of Constructive Trust Remedy 
The court will have jurisdiction to award a constructive trust once a restitutionary claim 
is made out. Then the court will consider whether it will exercise this jurisdiction to grant the 
constructive trust remedy. The establishment of a principled basis for the application of a 
constructive trust is important. It should provide some guidelines (as opposed to rules) to the 
lower courts and the commercial community at large as to when and why the imposition of a 
constructive trust may be appropriate. Consistency in judicial attitude and a degree of certainty 
and predictability of judicial reasoning are desirable. Furthermore, a constructive trust confers 
a beneficial interest in a property to the claimant. As such it has the effect of giving the 
claimant the status of a secured creditor with respect to the property. The basis for the judicial 
creation of a property right is clearly called for. 
122Above n 27. Per Deane J. 
123"Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract : ~ and The Fusion of Law and Equity" [1987] Lloyd's 
Mar & Com LQ 421. 
124Above n 123,441. 
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On this question the Canadian law is growing and developing. On the other hand, New 
Zealand authorities are few and undeveloped. It is believed that the New Zealand Courts will 
have to consider this important matter soon. 
It is submitted in this paper that the New Zealand Courts should attempt to develop 
guidelines as to when the remedy of constructive trust will be granted as the second stage after 
requiring a restitutionary claim to be established. In doing so, it is suggested that the Courts 
should give due attention to the law of remedies as a whole. Regard should particularly be 
given to the development of specific performance which shares many characteristics with the 
remedy of the constructive trust. This will enable us to have a more coherent system of 
remedies. 
The Courts should, nevertheless, retain an overriding discretion as to whether to grant a 
constructive trust. They should be looking at all the circumstances of the case and examining 
the overall justice of the case to see whether it is just and reasonable that the remedy be granted. 
To this end, relevant factors are: 
( 1) The adequacy of other remedy; 
(2) The conduct of the defendant; 
(3) The conduct of the claimant, and 
( 4) Other special reasons. 
(1) The Inadequacy Doctrine: Equitable remedies developed historically to 
address situations where the common law was inadequate to remedy a wrong. The inadequacy 
doctrine asks whether the personal remedy of damages provided by the common law is 
adequate as a matter of fact to remedy the wrong done to the claimant. Normally, it will not be 
adequate where the unjust enrichment involves the acquisition by the defendant of a land, or of 
a unique chattel. If damages are not adequate the remedy of constructive trust can be ordered. 
The basic jurisdictional doctrine of inadequacy, though criticised by Paciocco as an outdated 
analysis which has no substance, 125 has been adopted as the primary criteria by many 
commentators and a number of courts. 126 
125Above n 107,337. 
126Above n 1 generally, La Forest J judgment. 
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(2) The Conduct of the Defendant: Goff and Jones argue that a dishonest 
defendant should more readily be made a constructive trustee.
127 Paciocco suggests that the 
wrong doing of the defendant has no bearing on the justification for awarding the claimants a 
constructive trust remedy_ 12s 
It is submitted that the view expressed by Goff and Jones should be adopted, as 
discretionary remedies are one judicial tool by which social policy and commercial morality can 
be enforced in circumstances where the legislature does not provide incentives. As such, if the 
defendant is morally culpable, it should be harder for him or her to retain the property 
wrongfully acquired. 
(3) The Conduct of the Claimant: "[H]e who comes to equity must come with 
clean hands" - the conduct of the claimant may disentitle him or her to equitable relief. There 
are doubts as to whether the negligence of the claimant is relevant. Goff and Jones suggests 
that it is relevant in deciding whether a restitutionary proprietary relief should be ordered.
129 
Paciocco, however, submits that the negligence of the claimant should be considered relevant 
only where actual prejudice to the general creditors of the defendant has resulted.
130 It is 
submitted that the conduct of the plaintiff is as significant as the conduct of the defendant in 
determining whether the remedy of constructive trust should be granted. No specific and rigid 
rules are necessary in this regard. 
( 4) Special Circumstance: There may be other special circumstances in the case 
why a claimant should or should not be awarded the remedy of constructive trust. An example 
is where the respondent is insolvent. 
An important feature of the remedy of constructive trust is that it confers on the plaintiff 
a proprietary interest in property, making the plaintiff a secured creditor viz a viz other general 
creditors of the defendant. In cases where the defendant is insolvent, the result of the 
imposition of constructive trust is that the plaintiff will have a prior claim over the defendant's 
estate over and above other creditors. 
127The Law of Restitution (3ed) (1986) 62. 
128David Paciocco, "The Remedial Constructive Trust: A Principled Basis for Priorities over Creditors" (1989) 
Can B Rev 315, 347. 
129 Above n 117, 62. 
130 Above n 128, 346. 
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This violates the basic policy of "pari passu" where property in liquidation should be 
applied in satisfaction of its liability equally. Questions must be asked as to why the plaintiff 
should not be on an equal footing with general creditors of the defendant. As opposed to a 
claim between the defendant and the plaintiff, in the insolvency of the defendant the claim will 
be between the creditors of the defendant and the plaintiff. 
Paciocco purports to resolve this difficulty by "the acceptance of risk" theory. This 
theory suggests that if the claimant accepts the risk of the defendant's insolvency he should be 
treated the same as a general creditor. Conversely, if the claimant does not accept the risk of 
the defendants insolvency when dealing with the defendant, the claimant should have a prior 
claim over the claim of general creditors of the defendant.
131 This argument is sound and 
should be adopted. However it is important to bear in mind that this "acceptance of risk" 
theory should only apply in circumstances where the defendant is insolvent. 
For the purposes of this paper, I have confined myself to the considerations for the 
imposition of the constructive trust remedy in a commercial context. However, it must be noted 
that the very first question that has to be answered by any court is whether the court should 
apply different tests, in granting a constructive trust, in respect of a commercial situation as 
opposed to a domestic situation. 
Paciocco suggests that "to achieve appropriate results, courts must apply different 
principles in commercial settings and family settings. 132 The learned writer says that a spousal 
relationship is maintained with little formality and little negotiation about how property is to be 
divided in the event of dissolution. In contrast, in a commercial arrangement, it is anticipated 
that this will be specifically provided for. Consequently, Paciocco suggests that the court 
should employ a more relaxed and a less stringent test in a family situation. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the fair treatment of the parties to a spousal 
relationship has a broad social policy implication which goes beyond the usual commercial 
considerations. This invites the application of constructive trust. On the other hand, the 
familiar concerns that the efficiency of commerce depends upon security of title and protection 
of third parties from undisclosed charges militates against proprietary relief in the commercial 
context. 133 
131Above n 128,340. 
132Above n 128, 327. 
133 Above n 128, 328. 
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The Court's Findin2 on Constructive Trust 
(l)Whether Constructive Trust is Available 
Applying the criteria of unjust enrichment to the facts, a restitutionary claim was upheld 
by the majority of the Supreme Court (La Forest (Lamer J concurring) and Wilson JJ). It is 
important to note that the majority found that "but for the action of Lac in misusing the 
information and thereby acquiring the Williams property, that property would have been 
acquired by Corona" .134 On the other hand, the minority found that Corona would have 
concluded with Lac a business arrangement with respect to the Williams property substantially 
similar to that Corona concluded with Teck - a 50:50 property interest with participation in the 
development course in the same ratio. 
It was argued that Corona never in fact owned the Williams property. As such, the 
property cannot be given back to them. The majority, however, held that the function of 
restitution is to ensure that where a plaintiff has been deprived of wealth that is either in his 
possession or would have accrued for his benefit, it is restored to him. 
On the whole, the majority held that Lac had been enriched by the acquisition of the 
Williams property which would have, but for the action of Lac, been acquired by Corona. 
Thus, there is an enrichment by Lac at the expense of Corona and that enrichment was unjust 
since the acquisition of the Williams property amounted to a breach of duty to Corona, either in 
a breach of fiduciary duty or a breach of confidence. Therefore, constructive trust was 
available as a remedy. 
The next question was whether constructive trust was an appropriate remedy on the 
facts of International Corona. 
(2)Whether Constructive Trust an Appropriate Remedy 
La Forest J noted the "remedial flexibility" of an action for breach of confidence and 
breach of fiduciary duty in that a number of remedies such as injunctions, accounts of profit, 
compensations and constructive trust are available. In view of this flexibility, His Honour 
thought detailed consideration must be given to the reasons why a remedy measured by Lac's 
gain at Corona's expense is more appropriate than a remedy compensating Corona for the loss 
134 Above n 1, 44-46. 
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suffered.135 In this case, the Court of Appeal found that if compensatory damages were to be 
awarded, those damages in fact equated the value of the property. 
The inadequacy doctrine played an important part in Their Honours' decision to award 
constructive trust. La Forest J (Lamer J concurring) was in entire agreement with the Court of 
Appeal which found that: 
[G]old properties of significance are unique and rare. There are insurmountable 
difficulties in assessing the value of such a property in the open market. The actual 
damage which has been sustained by Corona is virtually impossible to determine with 
any degree of accuracy. The profitability of the mine, and accordingly its value, will 
depend on the ore reserves of the mine, the future price of gold from time to time, 
which in tum, depends on the rate of exchange between US dollar and Canadian dollar, 
inflationary trends, together with myriad of other matters, all of which are virtually 
impossible to predict.136 
Besides, La Forest J viewed the imposition of a restitutionary remedy, which restores 
an asset to the party who would have acquired it but for a breach of fiduciary duties or duties of 
confidence, acts as a deterrent to a breach of those duties and strengthens the social fabric those 
duties are imposed to protect. La Forest J remarked: 
The essence of the imposition of fiduciary obligations is its utility in the promotion and 
preservation of desired social behaviour and institutions. Likewise with the protection 
of confidences ... The institution of bargaining in good faith is one that is worthy of 
legal protection in those circumstances where that protection accords with the 
expectations of the parties. 137 
Therefore, if by breaching an obligation of confidence one party is able to acquire an 
asset entirely for itself, at the risk of only having to compensate the other for what the other 
would have received if a formal relationship between them were concluded, the former would 
be given a strong incentive to breach the obligation and acquire the asset. 
135 Above n 1, 47-50. 
136Above n 1, 49. Above n 3, 651. 
137 Above n 1, 47. 
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Hence, a majority of the Court concluded that a constructive trust was most appropriate 
in the circumstances because of: 
( 1) the uniqueness of the Williams property; 
(2) the difficulty of assessing damages; and 
(3) the moral quality of Lac's acts. 
While acknowledging that the last factor was the least important as regard restitution, 
the majority observed that to allow the defendant to retain a specific asset when it was obtained 
through conscious wrong doing may so offend a court that it would deny to the defendant the 
right to retain the property_ 138 
It has been suggested by Klinck that the decision in International Corona that Lac were 
to hold the property on a constructive trust solely for Corona is extreme . The argument is that 
Corona should not be better off when the joint venture did not eventuate. Had there been a 
joint venture contract, Lac would have held the property on a constructive trust for itself and 
Corona jointly. Corona would only be entitled to half of the property.
139 
It is submitted that this argument is too simplistic. If a joint venture had been concluded Lac 
would have held the property on a constructive trust for both Lac and Corona jointly, as 
Corona, by the joint venture, would have intended the information, and thus the property , to be 
shared between Lac and itself. However, in International Corona there is no evidence to 
suggest that Corona intended Lac to benefit from the information, and thus the property , if the 
joint venture did not eventuate. 
Summary 
A principled approach to the award of a constructive trust is demonstrated reasonably 
adequately in International Corona by La Forest J. The first step is a question of jurisdiction. 
A court will have jurisdiction to award constructive trust if a restitutionary claim is made out. 
Secondly, the court will exercise this jurisdiction if the remedy is considered to be most 
138Above n 1, 47. 
139 Above n 14,614. 
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appropriate in the circumstances, due regard being given to various factors such as the 
adequacy of other remedies and the conduct of the parties. 
In contrast to the Canadian approach, the New Zealand Courts adopt the "palm tree 
justice" or the "Chancellor's foot" approach, where a constructive trust is awarded if it is "just 
and reasonable" on a case-by-case basis. To date, no guidelines (as opposed to rules) have 
been prescribed as to when it will be "just and reasonable" to impose a constructive trust. As 
has been submitted in this paper, though absolute certainty is not necessary, some guidelines as 
to when a constructive trust will be imposed are desirable. 
VII COUNTER-RESTITUTIONARY REMEDY 
If the Williams property was to be held on constructive trust for Corona, what was to 
become of the improvements on the property made by Lac during the period where they had 
possession? If Corona received the Williams property without having to pay for the 
improvements which they necessarily would have had to incur in order to exploit the property, 
Corona would certainly be unjustly enriched. But Lac had run the risk, for it had made the 
improvements with knowledge of Corona's possible claim in the property. 
The trial Judge made an order of $153,978,000 in favour of Lac on this improvements 
on the basis of section 37(1) of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1980. That section 
allows a person who "makes improvements on other's land under the belief that it is his own" 
to have a "lien" upon the land to the extent of the amount by which its value is enhanced by the 
improvements. 
Clearly this section does not apply to the facts of International Corona. It only applies 
to a situation where one unknowingly makes a mistake as to the ownership of a land and 
thereby effects some improvements on that land. 
The Court of Appeal dealt with Lac's claim for the improvement on the doctrine of 
change of circumstances. It stated: 
We are persuaded of the soundness of the exposition of the applicable principles found 
in Goff and Jones ... under the heading "Change of Position" ... in arguing that some 
changes imposition should be permitted to be a partial defence to a restitutionary clain1 
where it would be inequitable to compare a defendant to make full restoration ... the 
48 
circumstances of this case, we believe, justify going further than Goff and Jones 
propose and permitting the defendant this par1ial defence .... 
140 
This approach of the Court of Appeal was heavily criticised as it employed an equitable 
defence not as a defence but as an independent cause of action.
141 The doctrine was not used 
to deplete or to reduce the constructive trust but rather to launch an independent claim for 
improvements. The claim for the improvements is a counter-restitutionary claim. Professor 
Birks describes this claim as the 
II giving up that which the plaintiff must do in order to qualify 
for restitution from the defendant.
11 142 
This counter-restitution by Lac is premised on the benefit which the improvement 
rendered to Corona. It is similar to the action by one who had mistakenly improved anothers 
chattel, as in Greenwood v Bennett, 143 or that of a breaching fiduciary claiming for just 
allowance for work and skill in Boardman v Phipps. 144 
In the Supreme Court, La Forest J in delivering the majority judgment of the Court on 
this point held that Corona would receive an enrichment in the amount of the value of the 
improvement of the land when Lac hands over the property to Corona. The value is equal to 
what would have been spent by Corona to develop both properties less what Corona in fact 
spent. His Honour stated: 
The three elements of a claim for restitution are made out, namely, there is an 
enrichment (the mine), that enrichment accrued to Corona at Lac's expense, and the 
enrichment is unjustified. The enrichment is not justified since, on the assumption that 
Corona had acquired the Williams property, it would of necessity have had to spend 
funds to develop the mine. In these circumstances Lac is entitled to restitutionary 
remedy, namely a lien on the Williams property to the extent that Corona was saved 
necessary expenditure. 145 
In the end, Lac was still entitled to a just allowance for the improvements it had made to 
the property albeit on different grounds. 
140Above n 2,601. 
141Gibbens, "International Corona Resources Limited v Lac Minerals Limited - Where Equity Rushes In" 
(1987-88) 13 Can B L J, 482, 499-500. 
142Birks An Introduction to The Law of Restitution (1985), 
143(1973] QB 195 . 
144(1967] 2 AC 46. 
145 Above n 1, 53. 
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VIII CONCLUSION 
Although the instrumental use of the fiduciary concept has been abandoned, "fiduciary" 
continues to be a protean term. It is now employed in cases where other more relevant and 
appropriate legal concepts should have been used. As demonstrated above, International 
Corona is a case where the concept of good faith should have been involved. Instead, the 
fiduciary concept was employed by the lower courts and the minority Judges in the Supreme 
Court of Canada to establish a liability. 
It is submitted that this inappropriate use of the fiduciary concept should be abandoned. 
The concept should only be used in a truly trust-like situation where one person acts in the 
interest, or for the benefit of another in the exercise of a specially delegated power. The 
authorities on this point are numerous. Besides, the incidence of the fiduciary duty - the strict 
duty of loyalty and fidelity - points clearly to these criteria as constituting a fiduciary 
relationship giving rise to the corresponding fiduciary duties. 
The fusion of Law and Equity has brought about a "remedial flexibility" - a situation 
where all remedies, Common law or Equitable, are available in a wide range of situation not 
depending upon the jurisdictional basis of the cause of action. Consequently, a clear division 
between rights and remedies is emerging with a probable result of legal developments along 
two branches of law - the law of obligations and the law of remedies. 
In International Corona, the remedy of constructive trust has been awarded, not 
dependent on the existence or otherwise of a pre-existing property right or fiduciary duty. The 
Remedy is available when some wider ground of liability - a restitutionary claim - is 
established, and when the remedy is most appropriate in the circumstances having due regard 
to some guiding factors. 
It is submitted that the Canadian approach is more principled and should be adopted in 
New Zealand. The current New Zealand Court of Appeal's approach of awarding the 
constructive trust remedy when it is "fair" or "just and reasonable" to do so, affords little if any 
comfort to the lower courts and the wider community. Some degree of predictability and 
certainty about the circumstances in which constructive trusts will be imposed is clearly 
desirable. 
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